I met John McCloy in his office on the 46th Floor of the Chase Manhattan Bank, of which he was Chairman. I had been interested in him ever since C. Wrights Mills wrote about him as the central figure in the power Elite. He had been born in Philadelphia in 1895 and, fresh out of law school, he was assigned the task of investigating the 1917 Black Tom munitions explosion in Hoboken, N.J., for which he fixed responsibility on the German government. He became Assistant Secretary of War in World War II and in 1947 became president of the World Bank, then U.S. military governor and high commissioner for Germany (1949-52). He returned (1961-63) to government service to act as President Kennedy's principal disarmament adviser. He had his Secretary hold his calls--he first time anyone provided me with such uninterrupted time, and seemed completely confident in every answer.

The interview proceeded, according to my notes:

Q. How did the Commission get started?

A. First, we had to appoint a General Counsel. Warren's first suggestion was not accepted. But Mr. Rankin, his second choice, was accepted. For our staff, I suggested several lawyers and they all were approved. Next, we decided that we could not accept the FBI Reports.

Q. Were there were substantial changes from the FBI Report?

A. Yes. Our final Report was quite different

Q. Did the FBI Report pre-empt areas?

A. Not really. We investigated and opened many doors. It did, to some degree, influence the direction of our investigation, but it did not stop us from exploring any evidence we wanted to explore?

Q. Did the Staff work out well. Ford said he had his own separate staff investigators.

A. Well, Ford and the other Congressmen were only there part time. Dulles and myself were members in residence. We had more contacts, but in general, most of the contact was through Rankin.

Q. How did the executive sessions work?

A. Rankin was the only staff member to sit in. We had disagreements, but under discussions most problems worked themselves out.

Q. What about Connally bullet disagreement?

A. Russell threatened to dissent from a report that said Connally and Kennedy were hit by the same bullet. I wanted a consensus report and suggested we reword it to say there was only "credible evidence." There was an argument over adjectives and "persuasive" finally won out over credible.

Q. Was Russell alone?

A. No. But he was most definite. He knew Connally and knew that Connally knew firearms. He gave weight to this. I had been with two men who were shot without knowing it. So I believed it was possible Connally was hit by same bullet as JFK, but I can't be definite. I sighted the rifle at the Texas School Book Depository etc. But Russell said he didn't believe paper evidence. All the members had independent judgement here, and as it wasn't essential to our case we let it go.

Q. Were there any other disagreements?

A. There was a disagreement on what to publish. It was like the Bridge At St. Louis. we had uncovered a lot of stories of minor scandals, not relevant to our investigation. We decided not to publish them.

Q. Did you have any pet area of interest?

A. Yes. I was interested in the espionage angle. I spent 10 years investigating Black Tom explosions--that's how I got into Government. I thought Oswald was trained in Espionage. I saw a pattern--mail drops, micro dots, his code(?), his knowledge of sabotage, etc. I thought he might be a sleeper Soviet agent who went haywire. I think we put something of that in the Report, I did, but it was toned down. The others said my evidence was not "evidential." I still believe it is possible some document will turn up showing Oswald might have been an agent. Not necessarily a conspiracy but an agent gone haywire.

Q. Did Russia cooperate with your Commission?

A. Not really, only pro forma. They held back a lot. For them, it was all public relations.

Q. Did the seven members attend meetings?

A. Congress was in session, as was the Supreme Court. Dulles and I attended the most--"in residence." Warren worked hard but could not been at all meetings. The other members-- they wont admit it-came less frequently. They were in and out on Quorum calls. Cooper was the best. Ford, Boggs and Russell came the least.

Q. Did you have an assistant?

A. Yes. Patrick Burns. I also sent down young law clerks to help at the end.

Q. How did Warren work out?

A. He is a great administrator. Stubborn as a mule, and never gives in on-a point.

Q. How did Staff and Commission mesh?

A. We worked independent of one another. The staff was young and inexperienced. We knew that these problems were exceedingly complicated and could not be answered simply. We had all known and dealt with the complicated problems of Government before.

Q. What was the role of Howard Willens? The deputy?

A. He was one of [deputy attorney general] Katzenbach's boys. Katzenbach him in there to keep us on the right track There was already an independent investigator (Redlich) and there were some clashes. Willens was a bureaucrat and had a different perspective. Willens had to be reprimanded several times by the chief justice.

Once he kept material from us--evidence-- he locked it in his top drawer, afraid we weren't read for it. He wanted to be the star-- thought this case would make him. He is ambitious, and will probably write a book. We finally forced him to give us the evidence. He also reported to Katzenbach, gave him different story.

Q. Who wrote the Report?

A. The staff, Redlich & Goldberg, wrote the bulk of the Report. But you should have seen the first draft. We tore it apart. It was not legalistic. We deleted adjectives, made it less categorical, and more believable -- Lawyers were carried away. Wanted to make everything definite, close every door. We rewrote it and made it more legal.

Q. Why did you insert "It is impossible to prove a negative" paragraph?

A. To make it more believable if we said categorically there was no conspiracy. We don't know if it would be believed. People are suspicious of categorical statements. We don't know if someone would show a link between Ruby and Oswald, or what. This paragraph left the door ajar, but dispelled doubts of a conspiracy. We had to show Foreign government we weren't a South American Banana Republic AND WE could deal with our own problems.

Q. What were these Foreign implications?

A. I went to Canada, France, Germany, England, and told these people hot to co off half-cocked, but to wait for our Report.

Q. Was Commission more interested in Conclusion than details?

A. Yes. We let the staff worry about "How." But all the members were interested in every fact and we went into excruciating details when we were in doubt.

Q. Why was Kennedy autopsy left out?

A. Taste. We didn't want to show naked pictures of the President.

Q. Agreement on not publishing?

A. We agreed not to publish anything. But Ford, scandalously, had already sold his story to Life Magazine for a good deal of money.

Q. How did you decide to terminate the investigation?

A. There was no political pressure. But stories in European papers were putting pressure on us and we decided to settle the cloud of dust.

We talked for over 2 hours. Clearly, he held Ford and Boggs in low regard. He also made it clear that five of the members did not attend most meetings. And that the staff, divided in different factions, kept evidence locked away. And, despite the report, he believed that there was a espionage conspiracy: Oswald was a Soviet sleeper agent though not necessarily an assassination conspiracy.

The issue was now becoming whether the seven members of the Warren Commission had themselves investigated deeply enough to put their names on a report that claimed to be an exhaustive investigation. The Commissioners had established "general guidelines," as Senator Cooper put it, but left the "nitty-gritty" work of analyzing evidence, deposing witnesses, pursuing clues, resolving technical conflicts in testimony, and drafting chapters to its staff General Counsel Rankin.