Question:
On July 26, 2002, Russia announced that it was building
six nuclear reactors for the Islamic Republic of Iran,
four at Bushehr and two at Akhvaz. This project includes
a uranium-conversion plant that can be used for, among
other things, uranium enrichment.
Is the purpose of this multi-billion
dollar enterprise:
a) to provide
Iran with additional megawatts of electrical energy
for its power grid, or
b) to provide Iran with a "full ticket" nuclear threat
(or deterrent)?
Answer:
Nuclear reactors have dual-purposes: providing
electric energy and providing nuclear technology. Iran
does not have any immediate need for the 1,000 megawatts
of electricity that the Bushehr reactor would provide,
as is demonstrated by its destroying gas from its oil
fields that would produce otherwise 3,600 megawatts.
It is therefore safe to assume that the purpose of these
nuclear reactors is to provide Iran with the technology
it needs to transform itself into a nuclear power.
To build nuclear warheads, Iran needs a supply of fissile
material, which is either enriched uranium or weapon-grade
plutonium. Its initial deal with Russia in 1995 included
a centrifuge plant which would have provided Iran with
this fissile material. But the plant was then canceled
under American pressure. But it could still get the
fissile material from the spent nuclear fuel (SNF),
which, when reprocessed, yields plutonium. Russia claimed
that the agreement called for all the spent nuclear
fuel to be sent back to Russia. However, leaked government
documents (released by Greenpeace) reveal that Russia,
despite these public assurances, had no contract for
repatriating this spent nuclear fuel from Iran. A Russian
government official said "The only reason we knew there
was no plan for the SNF from the original Bushehr reactor
is because internal documents were leaked to the press."
He added, "The ‘protocol of intent' means nothing in
terms of repatriating the fuel." So Iran may well have
the expectation that one way or another it will gain
access to fissile material after Bushehr is operational
in 2003. In explaining Russia's rationale, General
Yuri Baluyevsky, the Russian Deputy Chief of Staff said
at a press conference in June 2002, "Iran does have
nuclear weapons. These are non-strategic nuclear weapons.
I mean these are not ICBMs with a range of more than
5,500 kilometers... As for the danger of Iran's attack
on the United States, the danger is zero." General Baluyevsky's
extraordinary briefing implied that Iran had acquired
its fissile material from another source so there was
no reason for Russia not to complete the nuclear reactor
at Bushehr. He concluded"This co-operation will continue."
(The cooperation, aside from nuclear reactors, included
the delivery of Russian Kilo-class diesel- powered submarines,
Mig-29 fighters, Sukhoy bombers a global navigation
system and satellite-launching assistance .) General
Baluyevsky's assurances did not take into account, however,
Iran's program for developing missiles. By 2002, Iran
had tested a medium-range ballistic missile capable
of carrying a nuclear warhead, the Shahab-3 (based on
North Korea's Nodung missile) and had under development
longer range missiles, called the Shahab-4,5,6. These
latter missiles become intercontinental by adding a
solid-fueled stage. For Iran, a country with a 400 billion
dollar gross domestic product, this is not an unattainable
goal. Indeed, in 1998 (under Clinton), the Rumsfeld
Commission concluded : "The ballistic missile infrastructure
in Iran is now more sophisticated than that of North
Korea, and has benefited from broad, essential, long-
term assistance from Russia and important assistance
from China as well... We judge that Iran now has the
technical capability and resources to demonstrate an
ICBM-range ballistic missile ...within five years."
If Iran can siphon off small quantities of plutonium
from its reactors, and if the Rumsfeld Commission's
predications are accurate, the Islamic Republic of Iran
may have both nuclear warheads and intercontinental-
ballistic missiles (which do not need pinpoint accuracy
to attack cities) by the end of 2003.
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